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Defendants Google LLC and YouTube LLC (collectively “YouTube”) submit this 
opposition to Plaintiff Prager University’s (“PragerU”) motion for a preliminary injunction (ECF 
No. 25, “PI Mot.”). 
INTRODUCTION & SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff seeks an unprecedented injunction that would treat YouTube—a private 
company—as a state actor required by the federal and state constitutions to display PragerU’s 
videos to users who specifically opted for a more limited YouTube experience. Despite couching 
its requested injunction as “modest, narrow, and limited,” PragerU’s motion is a radical attempt 
to rewrite the rules governing online services, one that would transform nearly every decision 
that service providers make about how content may be displayed on their platforms into a 
constitutional case to be arbitrated by the courts. The legal, practical, and social consequences of 
this result would be profound. Under Plaintiff’s approach, online services like YouTube would 
be deterred—if not altogether prevented—from engaging in all manner of valuable content 
regulation, from removing material that is hateful, offensive, sexually explicit, or violent, to 
creating tools that allow sensitive users to avoid categories of videos they have indicated they 
would rather not see.   
        Plaintiff’s proposed injunction has no basis in law and runs directly afoul of 
YouTube’s own constitutional and statutory rights. Indeed, it is YouTube—not PragerU—that is 
protected by the First Amendment here. The First Amendment allows YouTube to determine 
how best to display content on its service, and it bars lawsuits, like this one, based on YouTube’s 
efforts to accommodate the preferences of users who would rather avoid certain types of content. 
For that reason, and because YouTube is a private actor that does not stand in the shoes of the 
state, Plaintiff has no likelihood of succeeding on its First Amendment claim or on its similar 
claim under the California Constitution. PragerU’s effort to expand into entirely new terrain 
narrow cases involving “company towns” and shopping malls is doctrinally unsound, contrary to 
all applicable law, and would have extremely harmful consequences.  
Likewise, PragerU’s request for an injunction overriding YouTube’s decision to give its 
users a tool they can use to restrict the kinds of videos they see on the service is directly contrary 
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to Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. Congress enacted the immunities codified 
in Sections 230(c)(2)(B) and 230(c)(1) to encourage online service providers to create such 
regulatory tools for the benefit of their users and to protect the editorial judgments online service 
providers make in regard to user-submitted content. While these immunities may not apply to 
Plaintiff’s (meritless) First Amendment claim, they foreclose all the other claims that PragerU 
asserts in this action—and any request for a preliminary injunction based on those claims.  
         Even beyond the First Amendment and Section 230, PragerU has no chance of prevailing 
on its claims under the Unruh Act, California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL), or for breach of 
the implied covenant of good faith. With respect to the Unruh Act, PragerU does not even 
attempt to explain how YouTube’s conduct amounts to intentional discrimination, and the 
evidence shows that YouTube acted with no such intent. As to the UCL, Plaintiff fails to make 
plausible allegations that YouTube’s classification of PragerU’s videos as ineligible for 
Restricted Mode was unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent—or caused PragerU to suffer economic 
injury. Finally, Plaintiff cannot succeed in its claim for breach of the implied covenant because 
YouTube’s terms and policies make clear that YouTube may remove or restrict access to content 
and may enable its users to do the same. YouTube did not breach its agreement by doing what it 
specifically advised users, including PragerU, that it had the right to do.  
On top of its baseless case on the merits, Plaintiff cannot establish the other factors 
required for a preliminary injunction. PragerU is not suffering irreparable harm because a 
handful of its videos are not displayed to the small fraction of users who have asked YouTube to 
filter out certain categories of content. Plaintiff’s cries of “censorship” are just rhetoric: all of 
PragerU’s videos remain available on YouTube, where they can be viewed by anyone who does 
not have Restricted Mode enabled. As to those users who have opted into Restricted Mode, 
PragerU ignores their right to avoid more mature types of content—as well as the harm to 
YouTube’s own rights and interests that would be caused by an unprecedented injunction forcing 
it to include PragerU’s videos in Restricted Mode. Finally, such an injunction would be contrary 
to the public interest. Among other things, it would disregard the significant social value, 
reflected in Congress’s enactment of Section 230, in encouraging online service providers to 
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self-regulate, including by creating tools that help their users avoid potentially objectionable 
content. Plaintiff’s motion should be denied. 
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
A. YouTube and Its Content Policies 
Google operates YouTube, an online service that enables users around the world to post 
and share videos and related content. YouTube’s mission, “to give everyone a voice and show 
them the world,” is embodied in its “four essential freedoms”: freedom of expression, freedom of 
information, freedom of opportunity, and freedom to belong. Obstler Dec., Ex. A. But while 
YouTube is committed to providing a platform for speech, creativity, and self-expression, it is 
not a free-for-all. YouTube has extensive rules governing what kind of content is and is not 
allowed on the service and informing users of YouTube’s broad discretion to manage and restrict 
content. These rules and policies are reflected in various public documents, including YouTube’s 
Terms of Service and Community Guidelines, and its associated policies regarding its Restricted 
Mode and age-restriction features. See Declaration of Alice Wu (“Wu Decl.”), Exs. 1-6. 
YouTube’s Community Guidelines generally prohibit users from posting content that 
falls into any one of 12 categories, including nudity or sexual content, harmful or dangerous 
content, or violent or graphic content. Id., Ex. 2. YouTube’s policies also describe similar but 
separate categories of content that may be “age-restricted” (not shown to users who are logged 
out or under the age of 18), or made unavailable to users who have chosen to enable YouTube’s 
“Restricted Mode” tool. Id., Exs. 3, 5. These decisions require the exercise of judgment, and the 
categories are defined in ways that resist bright-line rules that might be insensitive to context and 
that could be exploited by users looking for perceived loopholes. Id. ¶¶ 8, 28. 
To enforce these policies, YouTube uses automated review systems and employs a staff 
of thousands of human content reviewers, which review content on the service 24 hours a day, 
seven days a week. Id. ¶ 10. YouTube also invites its users to report or “flag” content that they 
consider inappropriate, and these requests come in constantly. Id. ¶ 11 & Ex. 7. YouTube’s staff 
reviews user flags to determine whether the flagged content complies with YouTube’s 
Community Guidelines and other content policies. Id. ¶¶ 12-13, 15-16.  
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B. YouTube’s Restricted Mode and Age-Restrictions 
As part of its efforts to create an environment that is enjoyable for everyone, YouTube 
offers an optional feature called Restricted Mode. This feature allows users to choose a more 
limited YouTube experience, one that does not include videos that may be objectionable to 
YouTube’s younger or more sensitive users. Id. ¶¶ 17-18. Restricted Mode is completely 
optional: it is turned off by default, but can be enabled by users, including individuals, families, 
or institutions like schools and libraries that provide online access to members of the public. Id. 
¶¶ 21-22. While Restricted Mode is an important tool for those who use it, those users represent 
only a very small fraction of YouTube’s overall user base: on an average day, approximately 
1.5% of YouTube’s users have Restricted Mode enabled. Id. ¶ 22. 
To help identify videos that will (and will not) be available in Restricted Mode, YouTube 
classifies videos on its service according to a multi-level rating scale. Content that YouTube 
determines is safer and more family-friendly is rated “G” or “PG”; content that YouTube deems 
more appropriate for mature audiences is rated “Teen” or “MA.” Id. ¶ 25. YouTube’s policies 
identify six general categories of content that may be rated Teen or MA: drugs and alcohol, 
sexual situations, violence, mature subjects, profane and mature language, and incendiary and 
demeaning content. Id. ¶ 27. Videos rated Teen or MA are not available in Restricted Mode but 
remain available on YouTube’s general service and are fully available to the approximately 
98.5% of users on an average day who do not have Restricted Mode turned on. Id. ¶¶ 22, 25.1
Offering Restricted Mode helps YouTube strike an appropriate balance between user 
self-expression and the creation of a safe environment that can be enjoyed by users of all 
sensibilities. This tool enables YouTube users to post videos on a wide range of topics—
including politically sensitive, sexual, or violent subjects—while at the same time giving more 
1 As noted above, YouTube also sometimes age-restricts videos. Restricted Mode and age-
restrictions operate in different ways. Restricted Mode, which excludes all age-restricted videos 
as well as all videos classified as Teen or higher, must be affirmatively enabled by the user. Age 
restrictions, which are applied following manual review or at the election of the video’s creator, 
cause videos to be filtered out from view for all logged-out users and from users under 18, 
regardless of whether those users have enabled Restricted Mode. Wu Decl. ¶¶ 35-37. 
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sensitive users the ability to limit the range of videos that may be viewed on their accounts. In 
short, through Restricted Mode, YouTube is able to offer its users two different viewing 
experiences within a single platform: one for a general audience, which includes any uploaded 
videos that comply with YouTube’s Community Guidelines; and one for a more limited group of 
users who self-identify as more sensitive and wish to avoid potentially mature content. 
C. YouTube’s Review Process For Restricted Mode 
YouTube classifies videos on its rating scale in two different ways. First, YouTube uses 
an algorithmic system that automatically evaluates every video on the service based on different 
“signals,” including the title, metadata, and language in the video. Wu Decl. ¶ 29. This 
mechanism allows YouTube to efficiently review a massive volume of content—over 500,000 
hours of new video content uploaded per day—and assign ratings to it. Id. ¶ 9. 
YouTube’s automated system is not perfect, particularly given the significant technical 
challenges involved with algorithmically understanding, and classifying at scale, the remarkable 
diversity of video content that is uploaded to the platform. Id. ¶¶ 9, 29-31 & Ex. 3. To 
supplement its automated review tools, human reviewers also sometimes manually review videos 
and assign ratings based on additional criteria—such as context, tone, and focus—to determine 
how videos should be rated. Id. ¶¶ 28-31. 
YouTube manually reviews videos that users flag as “potentially inappropriate,” as well 
as every video submitted via YouTube’s Restricted Mode feedback process. Id. ¶¶ 13, 30, 32. 
This feedback process allows uploaders who believe that their videos have been incorrectly 
classified by the automated system to appeal those classifications. Id. ¶ 32 & Exs. 3, 10. In 
response to such appeals, YouTube manually reviews the video(s) at issue and, if appropriate 
under YouTube’s policies, may change the classification initially made by its system. Id. ¶ 33. 
YouTube’s manual-review determinations are also used to train its automated system to make 
better and more reliable determinations. Id. ¶ 34.  
D. PragerU and the Classification of Its Videos On YouTube 
         Plaintiff Prager University (“PragerU”) is a media organization that seeks to provide 
conservative perspectives on current events and issues of public interest by posting short videos 
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on its own website and on the YouTube service. Strazzeri Decl. ¶ 1. Over 1.2 million users 
subscribe to PragerU’s YouTube channel, which currently has posted 345 public videos. Wu 
Decl. ¶ 38 & Ex. 11. 
Many of PragerU’s videos address controversial and mature topics, including, for 
example, a video entitled “Are 1 in 5 Women Raped at College?,” which includes an animated 
depiction of a nearly naked man lunging at a group of women and discusses college rape culture. 
Id. ¶ 42. Like all of the videos posted on YouTube, YouTube’s automated systems reviewed 
every video uploaded to PragerU’s channel. Id. ¶ 39. Because of the mature themes they address, 
and the way the videos address those themes, 41 of those videos are classified as “Teen” or 
higher by the system, rendering them ineligible for display to users that have turned on 
Restricted Mode. Id. ¶¶ 39-40 & Ex. 12.  
While PragerU did not use YouTube’s formal feedback form before filing this lawsuit, it 
had occasionally contacted YouTube to challenge the fact that some of its videos were 
unavailable in Restricted Mode. Id. ¶ 43. In response, YouTube manually reviewed all the 
PragerU videos classified with a Teen rating. Id. ¶¶ 40, 44, 46. Based on that review, YouTube 
changed the classifications of some of the videos, making them available to users in Restricted 
Mode, and confirmed the classifications of others, which remain unavailable in Restricted Mode. 
Id. ¶¶ 40, 46. At present, therefore, only 41 of the 345 videos that PragerU has publicly posted on 
YouTube— less than 12% of the total number of videos on PragerU’s channel—are rated Teen 
or higher, which renders them unavailable in Restricted Mode. Id. ¶¶ 39-40 & Ex. 12. None of 
PragerU’s videos are age-gated, however, and all of its videos are available for viewing on 
YouTube’s general service by users not using Restricted Mode. Id. ¶ 39.  
YouTube’s classification of certain PragerU videos as “Teen” or higher was not based on 
any disagreement with PragerU’s politics or the political ideology expressed in the videos. Id. ¶¶ 
39-41, 50-52 & Ex. 12. To the contrary, those ratings were based on YouTube’s careful 
evaluation and determination—which included individual human review—that those videos are 
best reserved for a more mature audience because they included discussions of sexual situations, 
violence, and other mature subjects. Id. ¶¶ 39-42. These classifications had nothing to do with 
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the fact that PragerU created the content; indeed, more than 88 percent of PragerU’s videos are 
rated G or PG and thus are available even to the small percentage of YouTube users who have 
opted into Restricted Mode. Id. ¶ 39. By contrast, a number of channels from varied points across 
the political spectrum have a lower percentage of their videos available in Restricted Mode—for 
example, fewer than half of the videos posted by The Daily Show are now available in Restricted 
Mode. Id. ¶ 51.  
E. Proceedings In This Case 
Even though YouTube repeatedly responded to PragerU’s requests for additional 
information about its classification decisions (id. ¶¶ 43-48), PragerU filed this lawsuit against 
YouTube on October 23, 2017. PragerU asserts claims under the U.S. and California 
Constitutions, the California Unruh Act, California’s Unfair Competition Law (UCL), the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and the Lanham Act. ECF No. 1. On December 
29, 2017, YouTube moved to dismiss all of Plaintiff’s claims as barred by YouTube’s First 
Amendment rights and Section 230, and for failure to state a claim. ECF No. 31 (“MTD”). At the 
same time, Plaintiff filed this motion for a preliminary injunction, relying on its constitutional 
and state law claims (not its Lanham Act claim). Both motions are currently pending and noticed 
for a combined hearing on March 15, 2018.  
LEGAL STANDARD 
Preliminary injunctions are “an extraordinary remedy never awarded as of right.” Winter 
v. NRDC, 555 U.S. 7, 24 (2008). Accordingly, a plaintiff seeking preliminary injunctive relief 
bears a heavy burden to satisfy a stringent, four-factor test. The plaintiff must show that: (1) it is 
likely to succeed on the merits of its claims; (2) it is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the 
absence of preliminary relief; (3) the balance of equities tips in the plaintiff’s favor; and (4) an 
injunction is in the public interest. Id. “The first factor under Winter is the most important”; 
“when ‘a plaintiff has failed to show the likelihood of success on the merits, “we need not 
consider the remaining three [Winter elements].”’” Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733, 740 
(9th Cir. 2015) (en banc). In addition, because PragerU seeks a mandatory injunction that would 
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order YouTube to take action, it “must establish that the law and facts clearly favor [its] position, 
not simply that [it] is likely to succeed.” Id.
Plaintiff misstates the applicable legal standard for obtaining a preliminary injunction, 
arguing that it need only show “serious questions going to the merits” plus a balance of hardships 
strongly tipped in its favor. See PI Mot. at 7-8. The “serious questions” standard does not apply 
here. Plaintiff seeks a mandatory injunction, which “are not granted unless extreme or very 
serious damage will result[,] and are not issued in doubtful cases.” Park Vill. Apartment Tenants 
Ass’n v. Mortimer Howard Tr., 636 F.3d 1150, 1160 (9th Cir. 2011); see also Hernandez v. 
Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 998-99 (9th Cir. 2017). Regardless, this is not a case where the precise 
articulation of the governing test changes the result. PragerU is not entitled to a preliminary 
injunction on any standard. 
ARGUMENT
I. PLAINTIFF HAS NO LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCEEDING ON ITS CLAIMS 
PragerU’s bid for a preliminary injunction fails for the most basic reason—the claims it 
asserts against YouTube have no reasonable chance of success. Those claims are barred by the 
First Amendment and Section 230 of the CDA, and fail on their own terms.  
A. Plaintiff’s Proposed Injunction Is Barred By the First Amendment 
PragerU’s claims are based on the First Amendment, but it ignores the First Amendment 
rights actually at stake. It is YouTube, not PragerU, whose First Amendment rights are 
threatened here. It is well settled that the First Amendment can serve as a defense against civil 
liability, immunizing defendants from claims that seek to hold them liable for exercising their 
First Amendment rights. See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451-52 (2011). Likewise, 
because injunctions “carry greater risks of censorship and discriminatory application than do 
general ordinances,” they require “a somewhat more stringent application of general First 
Amendment principles.” Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 764-65 (1994). 
These principles bar any preliminary injunction in this case.  
As explained in YouTube’s pending Motion to Dismiss (MTD at 13-15), the First 
Amendment protects YouTube’s “editorial control and judgment” over third-party content—
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including YouTube’s decision to exclude certain of PragerU’s videos from Restricted Mode. 
Miami Herald Publ’g Co., Div. of Knight Newspapers, Inc. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 
(1974). This broad protection covers choices about how to present, or whether to include, 
particular content on a given platform or service. Id.; Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 
622, 636 (1994) (cable operators engage in protected “editorial discretion” by selecting 
television programming); Hurley v. Irish Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp., 515 U.S. 557, 573-
74 (1995) (parade organizers engage in protected speech by selecting which marchers may 
participate in parade); Assocs. & Aldrich Co. v. Times Mirror Co., 440 F.2d 133, 135 (9th Cir. 
1971) (“the acceptance or rejection of articles submitted for publication … necessarily involves 
the exercise of editorial judgment”).   
“Since all speech inherently involves choices of what to say and what to leave unsaid, 
one important manifestation of the principle of free speech is that one who chooses to speak may 
also decide ‘what not to say.’” Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573; accord Levan v. Capital Cities/ABC, 
Inc., 190 F.3d 1230, 1243 (11th Cir. 1999) (“[t]he decision to air the interview of one person but 
not another is at heart an editorial decision”). This protection equally applies to editorial choices 
about video content, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Commc’ns, Inc., 476 U.S. 488, 494 
(1986), and by online service providers, Zhang v. Baidu.com, Inc., 10 F. Supp. 3d 433, 441 
(S.D.N.Y. 2014) (search engine protected by First Amendment for excluding search results on 
sensitive topics).  
In this case, PragerU challenges (and now seeks to enjoin) decisions that fall squarely 
within this protected category: YouTube’s decisions about which of the videos posted on its 
service should be made available to users who have enabled Restricted Mode. In making these 
decisions, YouTube is deciding how to categorize videos, whether to display those videos at all, 
and whether those video should be made available to certain segments of the YouTube audience, 
including users who have specifically opted for a more limited experience. These are exactly the 
kinds of judgments that the First Amendment protects.  
They are analogous to decisions made by publishers in selecting the “material to go into a 
newspaper, and the … limitations on the size and content of the paper, and treatment of public 
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issues and public officials.” Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 258; accord e-ventures Worldwide, LLC v. 
Google, Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88650, at *11-12 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 8, 2017) (“determining 
whether certain websites are contrary to Google’s guidelines and thereby subject to removal are 
the same as decisions by a newspaper editor regarding which content to publish, which article 
belongs on the front page, and which article is unworthy of publication.”). And, just as “the 
courts … should [not] dictate the contents of a newspaper,” Aldrich, 440 F.3d at 135, the First 
Amendment does not allow Plaintiff to use the courts to direct the contents of YouTube’s 
Restricted Mode. Accord Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 
727, 737-38 (1996) (plurality opinion) (because “the editorial function itself is an aspect of 
‘speech,’ a court’s decision that a private party, say, the station owner, is a ‘censor,’ could itself 
interfere with that private ‘censor’s’ freedom to speak as an editor”); Langdon v. Google, Inc., 
474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 629-30 (D. Del. 2007) (First Amendment prohibits order compelling search 
engines to “‘honestly’ rank Plaintiff’s websites”). 
PragerU ignores these principles, but they categorically bar its claims and, in particular, 
any injunction that would force YouTube to display PragerU’s videos in a manner that YouTube 
has determined, based on the exercise of its own judgment, would be contrary to the interest and 
preferences of its most sensitive users. “The First Amendment protects these decisions, whether 
they are fair or unfair, or motivated by profit or altruism.” e-ventures, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
88650, at *12; accord Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 570 U.S. 205, 213 
(2013) (“[F]reedom of speech prohibits the government from telling people what they must 
say.”). Plaintiff’s motion should be denied for this reason alone. This Court need go no further to 
reject a preliminary injunction.2
2 As discussed, the record makes clear that YouTube did not take action in regard to 
PragerU’s video because of ideological disagreement (see generally Wu Decl. ¶¶ 40-42, 49-52), 
but even if Plaintiff’s allegations on that point had merit, that would only reinforce YouTube’s 
First Amendment rights in this case. For a private party to restrict access to material based on an 
ideological judgment (which, to repeat, is not what actually happened here) would reflect the 
kind of “political expression” that is at the core of the First Amendment. See McIntyre v. Ohio 
Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 346 (1995); accord Zhang, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 440 (explaining 
that to hold a search engine liable for “a conscious decision to design its search-engine 
(continued...) 
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B. Plaintiff Has No Chance Of Prevailing On Its Constitutional Claims 
Plaintiff’s main argument in support of its request for a preliminary injunction is that 
YouTube’s classification of PragerU’s videos violates the First Amendment and the California 
Constitution. But Plaintiff has no chance of prevailing on these claims, even apart from their 
interference with YouTube’s own First Amendment rights. That is because YouTube simply is 
not a state actor regulated by the federal or state constitutions.  
1. YouTube Is Not the “Functional Equivalent” of a State Actor Under the 
First Amendment 
“It is, of course, a commonplace that the constitutional guarantee of free speech is a 
guarantee only against abridgment by government, federal or state.” Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 
507, 513 (1976); see also Cent. Hardware Co. v. NLRB, 407 U.S. 539, 546-47 (1972) (“The First 
and Fourteenth Amendments are limitations on state action, not on action by the owner of private 
property used only for private purposes.”). Here, however, Plaintiff defies this basic rule. 
YouTube, of course, is a private party, and PragerU does not argue that YouTube acts in 
coordination with the government. Instead, it asserts that YouTube is the “functional equivalent” 
of a state actor. PI Mot. at 14. Plaintiff’s argument has no basis in law, has consistently been 
rejected by courts, and would have disastrous consequences. 
None of the cases that Plaintiff relies on are on point, and they do not remotely support 
the idea that YouTube’s decisions about Restricted Mode are somehow the equivalent of 
censorship by the government. Id. at 14-16. Plaintiff cites Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & 
Educ. Fund, Inc., 473 U.S. 788 (1985), and Denver Area, 518 U.S. at 749-50, for the proposition 
that “public forums may include ‘private property dedicated to public use.’” PI Mot. at 15. But 
Plaintiff ignores that those cases involve speech restrictions by the government. In Cornelius, the 
NAACP (unsuccessfully) challenged an Executive Order excluding it from a government charity 
(...continued from previous page) 
algorithms to favor certain expression on core political subjects over other expression on those 
same political subjects … would plainly ‘violate[] the fundamental rule of protection under the 
First Amendment, that a speaker has the autonomy to choose the content of his own message’”).  
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drive, while Denver Area addressed a challenge to federal statute (and related FCC regulations) 
regulating cable broadcasting. These cases involve direct state action, and they do nothing to 
support the application of the First Amendment to restrict the rights of private parties to regulate 
speech on their own property. 
The same is true of Packingham v. North Carolina, 137 S. Ct. 1730 (2017) and Twitter, 
Inc. v. Sessions, 263 F. Supp. 3d 803 (N.D. Cal. 2017). While these cases do say that social 
media sites can be public forums, that does not help Plaintiff here. The whole point of the forum 
analysis in those cases was to limit the power of the government to restrict the speech of online 
services or their users. Packingham thus struck down a state law making it unlawful for a 
registered sex offender to access certain social media websites. And Twitter addressed a First 
Amendment challenge brought by an online service provider itself to a federal statute prohibiting 
it from speaking about a matter of public concern. This case is totally different. PragerU 
challenges not any government speech restriction, but YouTube’s private actions. And neither 
these cases—nor any others—question or limit the rights of service providers to control their 
own platforms or to make editorial judgments about the content submitted by their users.  
To the contrary, courts have consistently rejected previous attempts to treat YouTube and 
other online service providers as state actors. See Langdon, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 631-32 (rejecting 
constitutional claims because Google, Yahoo, and Microsoft are not state actors); 
Kinderstart.com, LLC v. Google, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22637, at *39-52 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 
16, 2007) (same for Google); Shulman v. Facebook, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 183110, at *8-10 
(D.N.J. Nov. 6, 2017) (same for Facebook); hiQ Labs, Inc. v. LinkedIn Corp., 2017 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 129088, at *29-34 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 14, 2017) (LinkedIn); Cyber Promotions, Inc. v. Am. 
Online, Inc., 948 F. Supp. 436, 456 (E.D. Pa. 1996) (AOL).   
Ignoring these holdings, Plaintiff cites Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946), arguing 
that, because YouTube opens its service to the public and generally tries to allow its users to 
express themselves, its thereby binds itself by the First Amendment. Marsh is inapposite. Like 
Packingham, Marsh involved a constitutional challenge to a criminal conviction under a state 
law. The Court’s analysis turned on the peculiar nature of a so-called “company town.” Though 
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privately owned, this town had “all the characteristics of any other American town. The property 
consists of residential buildings, streets, a system of sewers, a sewage disposal plant and a 
‘business block’ on which business places are situated,” id. at 502—in short, “facilities … built 
and operated primarily to benefit the public” and which serve “essentially a public function,” id.
at 506. Given the essentially public nature of the property, the Supreme Court held that a state’s 
ban on pamphleteering could not be enforced there consistent with the First Amendment.  
That Marsh is limited to company towns—and cannot be read to support the proposition 
that the First Amendment applies broadly on private property held open to the public—is 
confirmed by subsequent cases. While the Supreme Court in Amalgamated Food Employees 
Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968), briefly extended the 
reasoning in Marsh to a privately owned shopping mall, the Court repudiated Logan Valley in 
Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972), before expressly overruling it in Hudgens, 424 U.S. 
at 518 (explaining that “the ultimate holding in Lloyd amounted to a total rejection of the holding 
in Logan Valley”). These cases make clear that “Marsh was never intended to apply to this kind 
of situation”—instead, “the basis on which the Marsh decision rested was that the property 
involved encompassed an area that for all practical purposes had been turned into a town.” Lloyd, 
407 U.S. at 562-63 (quoting Logan Valley, 391 U.S. at 330-31 (Black, J., dissenting)).  
It is clear, therefore, that these cases provide no license for Plaintiff’s effort to muddy the 
fundamental constitutional distinction between private and state action. Indeed, Lloyd rejected 
the very argument that PragerU presses in this case: that YouTube is bound by the First 
Amendment insofar as it holds out its service as a forum for use by the public. The Court held 
that property does not “lose its private character” merely because it is “open to the public” or 
because “the public is generally invited to use it for designated purposes.” Id. at 568-69; see also 
id. at 563 (rejecting “the suggestion that the privately owned streets and sidewalks of a business 
district or a shopping center are the equivalent, for First Amendment purposes, of municipally 
owned streets and sidewalks”). Instead, “[b]efore an owner of private property can be subjected 
to the commands of the First and Fourteenth Amendments the privately owned property must 
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assume to some significant degree the functional attributes of public property devoted to public 
use.” Cent. Hardware, 407 U.S. at 546-47 (emphasis added).  
There is nothing like that here. YouTube does not resemble a company town: it does not 
stand “in the shoes of the State,” and there “is no comparable assumption or exercise of 
municipal functions or power.” Lloyd, 407 U.S. at 569. Nor is it a public utility that happens to 
be in private hands that is “substituting for and performing the customary functions of 
government.” Id. at 562. Plaintiff’s rhetoric does not change reality. Accord Howard v. Am. 
Online Inc., 208 F.3d 741, 754 (9th Cir. 2000) (allegation that AOL is a “‘quasi-public utility’ 
that ‘involves a public trust’ … is insufficient to hold that AOL is an ‘instrument or agent’ of the 
government”). To expand the First Amendment in the ways PragerU demands here would 
“constitute an unwarranted infringement of long-settled rights of private property protected by 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.” Cent. Hardware, 407 U.S. at 547.  
2. YouTube Is Not Bound By the Liberty of Speech Clause 
Plaintiff’s attempt to invoke the California Constitution’s Liberty of Speech Clause fares 
no better. As discussed above, even if PragerU were right about California law, applying such 
rules to YouTube would violate YouTube’s First Amendment rights. But beyond that, Plaintiff’s 
effort to expand the Liberty of Speech clause has no legal basis. PragerU makes two arguments, 
both of which fail. First, the limited exception established in Robins v. Pruneyard Shopping 
Center, 23 Cal. 3d 899 (1979), has essentially been limited to its facts and certainly does not 
apply to a private online service. Second, cases discussing the “public forum” requirement under 
California’s anti-SLAPP law have nothing to do with whether a private website is the equivalent 
of a state actor restrained by the Liberty of Speech Clause from regulating its own property.  
Pruneyard does not apply to YouTube. Plaintiff’s Pruneyard argument asks this Court 
to dramatically expand a state-law doctrine in ways that the California courts have consistently 
declined to do. Indeed, Pruneyard has never been applied beyond the context of shopping 
centers. See, e.g., Ralphs Grocery Co. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 8, 55 
Cal. 4th 1083, 1091-92 (2012) (narrowing Pruneyard to apply only to the common areas of a 
shopping center); Golden Gateway Ctr. v. Golden Gateway Tenants Ass’n, 26 Cal. 4th 1013, 
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1033 (2001) (refusing to apply Pruneyard to urban apartment complex); Donahue Schriber 
Realty Grp., Inc. v. Nu Creation Outreach, 232 Cal. App. 4th 1171, 1183-84 (2014) (refusing to 
apply Pruneyard to sidewalk areas of a shopping center); see also MTD at 16-18. To the 
contrary, California courts have rejected as “wishful thinking,” Plaintiff’s radical theory that 
Pruneyard allows a large private business to be judicially transformed into a public forum 
subject to constitutional limitations “simply because it is ‘freely and openly accessible to the 
public.’” Albertson’s, Inc. v. Young, 107 Cal. App. 4th 106, 117-18 (2003) (quoting Golden 
Gateway, 26 Cal. 4th at 1033); see also, e.g., Ralphs, 55 Cal. 4th at 1093.  
But even if there were some support for applying Pruneyard outside of shopping malls, 
there is none whatsoever for stretching the doctrine to entirely “virtual” online spaces, separate 
from physical real estate. As Judge Chen recently explained, “[n]o court has expressly extended 
Pruneyard to the Internet generally,” and “there are a host of potential ‘slippery slope’ problems 
that are likely to surface were Pruneyard to apply to the Internet.” hiQ, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
129088, at *31-32; see also Kinderstart.com, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22637, at *39-52. While 
taking such a step would be inappropriate generally, it certainly should not be taken by the 
federal courts without any support from the California Supreme Court. In short, there is no basis 
for Plaintiff’s radical effort to expand Pruneyard to YouTube and other online services.  
Plaintiff cannot use the anti-SLAPP law to treat YouTube as a state actor. Nor does 
California’s anti-SLAPP law offer PragerU a viable constitutional claim against YouTube. A 
SLAPP suit is “a meritless lawsuit ‘filed primarily to chill the defendant’s exercise of First 
Amendment rights.’” Paul v. Friedman, 95 Cal. App. 4th 853, 861 (2002). Plaintiff relies on a 
so-called “established rule that a ‘public forum’ under [California’s anti-SLAPP law (Cal. Civ. 
Proc. Code § 425.16)] is by definition a public forum under Pruneyard and the California 
constitution.” PI Mot. at 17 n.25. This is not a rule at all, much less an established one, which is 
why PragerU cites no actual authority to support it. While it may be true that “[t]he concept of a 
public forum was developed in, and has sole reference to, First Amendment cases,” Weinberg v. 
Feisel, 110 Cal. App. 4th 1122, 1131 n.4 (2003), that does not support PragerU’s contention that 
the owner of any publicly accessible website is bound by California’s Liberty of Speech Clause. 
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Plaintiff’s argument was recently rejected by Judge Chen, who explained that any such 
holding would lead to “potentially sweeping implications.” hiQ, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129088, 
at *34 (the “anti-SLAPP statute protects conduct beyond constitutionally protected speech 
itself”). And not one of the cases that PragerU cites supports its argument. In Barrett v. 
Rosenthal, 40 Cal. 4th 33 (2006), for example, the operator of an online forum invoked the anti-
SLAPP law—and Section 230 of the CDA—to (successfully) bar a lawsuit seeking to impose 
liability on the forum for allegedly defamatory messages posted by a user. The court explained 
that the website was a “public forum” under anti-SLAPP statute—without regard to whether the 
operator was a state actor. Id. at 40-41 n.4.3
Barrett, and other cases like it, make clear that websites are public forums in the sense 
that courts should prevent lawsuits like this one, which seek to limit the website operator’s 
protected right to regulate (or refrain from regulating) speech that occurs there. See, e.g., Cross v. 
Facebook, Inc., 14 Cal. App. 5th 190, 201-02 (2017) (applying anti-SLAPP law to strike claim 
attacking “Facebook’s decision not to remove [content], an act ‘in furtherance of [Facebook’s] 
right of petition or free speech’”). But that does not mean that the owners of websites are the 
equivalent of state actors whose decisions about how to regulate their own forums is subject to 
constitutional attack.  
3 Plaintiff cites Ralphs Grocery Co. v. Victory Consultants, Inc., 17 Cal. App. 5th 245, 253 
(2017), a case in which the Court of Appeal declined to apply the anti-SLAPP law to strike a 
private property owner’s claim for trespass against pamphleteers soliciting on their private 
property. Id. at 249-50. The court concluded that the sidewalks in front of the plaintiff’s grocery 
stores were not public forums and that the pamphleteers were not engaged in constitutionally 
protected activity. Id. at 260. So too here: Plaintiff has no protected right to speak on YouTube’s 
website. While the court may have confusingly blended the public forum analysis with the 
Pruneyard analysis, it certainly did not suggest, much less hold, that any place deemed a public 
forum for purpose of the anti-SLAPP law would therefore be a place where the property owner 
was treated as the equivalent of the state under the Liberty of Speech Clause or the First 
Amendment. Plaintiff also cites Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity, 19 Cal. 4th 
1106 (1999), and Dowling v. Zimmerman, 85 Cal. App. 4th 1400 (2001), but those cases do not 
appear to have any bearing on this case. Neither has anything to do with websites or online 
speech, and Briggs deals with a provision of the anti-SLAPP statute relating to statements made 
in connection with “official” government proceedings. Briggs, 19 Cal. 4th at 1111-13.
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Any contrary decision would have breathtaking consequences. It would mean that 
virtually any publicly accessible website—or any other place “sufficiently open to general public 
access,” Weinberg, 110 Cal. App. 4th at 1131 n.4—would suddenly be treated as public property. 
That result is unsupported by California law, and it would turn the anti-SLAPP law on its head. 
See hiQ, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129088, at *34. The anti-SLAPP law protects online services 
like YouTube against claims like these. Plaintiff cannot use that statute, and the important 
protections it provides against baseless litigation, to bootstrap an unprecedented constitutional 
attack on the way those private services regulate themselves.  
3. YouTube’s General Commitment to User Self-Expression Is Not a Basis 
For Treating It As the Equivalent of a State Actor  
In pressing its constitutional claims, PragerU tries to use YouTube’s general commitment 
to freedom of expression against YouTube itself. Plaintiff argues that because YouTube has 
publicly recognized the importance of user self-expression, creativity, and opportunity—
including through its embrace of “Four Freedoms” that help guide the service—YouTube is now 
legally bound by the federal and state constitutions to the same restrictions on content regulation 
that apply to the government. PI Mot. 18-20. As discussed above, Plaintiff’s argument is based 
on a flawed premise—that a private online service becomes the equivalent of a state actor 
because it is open to the public as a place for speech. But even if this premise were sound, it 
would not support the claims that PragerU advances here.  
Plaintiff’s reliance on YouTube’s statements in support of online expression omits a 
crucial part of the story: while those freedoms are important, they coexist, and have always 
coexisted, with strict rules about the kind of content that is acceptable on YouTube, and with  
policies allowing YouTube to restrict certain videos for the benefit of its users. These rules are 
reflected in YouTube’s Terms of Service and Community Guidelines, which prohibit certain 
kinds of material, as well as YouTube’s extensive public statements regarding its policies for 
restricting access to material in order to protect its younger or more sensitive users. See Wu Decl. 
¶¶ 5-7 & Exs. 1-6. These policies are integral to YouTube’s operation and to the enjoyment of its 
service by more than a billion people. YouTube enforces them on a constant basis. Id. ¶ 13.  
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In short, it simply is not the case that YouTube holds itself out to the world as a place for 
unfettered or unregulated expression. PragerU cannot focus on one narrow set of YouTube’s 
public statements while ignoring the rest. And it certainly cannot use that selective and distorted 
picture to transform YouTube into the equivalent of a state actor. It would make no sense to 
penalize an online service—depriving it of much of its right to self-regulate and subjecting it to 
potentially liability—simply because it generally prefers more speech to less. Such a holding 
would create perverse incentives for service providers to clamp down on user speech. It does not 
serve the values protected by the First Amendment—the values that PragerU claims to support—
to suggest that the only way for private online platforms to avoid being treated as state actors is 
to disclaim their public commitments to user self-expression. And it would be particularly absurd 
to adopt that rule here, given that PragerU’s videos were not even removed from YouTube. 
Instead, they were simply made unavailable to the tiny fraction of users who have chosen to use 
Restricted Mode—a feature YouTube offers precisely because it allows a nuanced balance 
between free expression and the protection of sensitive users from potentially unwanted content.4
4. Plaintiff Cannot Avoid the Disastrous Consequences of Treating YouTube 
As a State Actor 
Putting aside the total lack of doctrinal support for Plaintiff’s effort to subject 
YouTube—and virtually the entire Internet—to the standards of the First Amendment and the 
Liberty of Speech clause, the result that Plaintiff seeks would have profound social 
consequences.  
4 Plaintiff also argues that the recent repeal of the FCC Open Internet regulations should lead 
the Court to treat YouTube as a public utility. PI Mot. at 19. This argument makes no sense. 
Even when these regulations were in force, they never applied to YouTube (or services like it). 
As the D.C. Circuit explained in responding to concerns about exactly the result that PragerU 
requests—government regulation of “the editorial decisions” of Google and YouTube—“widely 
used web platforms such as Facebook, Google, Twitter, and YouTube … are not considered 
common carriers that hold themselves out as affording neutral, indiscriminate access to their 
platform without any editorial filtering.” U.S. Telecomm. Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 392 (D.C. 
Cir. 2017); accord id. at 434 (Kavanaugh, J. dissenting).  
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If the First Amendment actually bound private online service providers as it binds the 
government, those providers would be significantly constrained in their ability to act even 
against highly offensive or objectionable content. In such a world, YouTube and other online 
services would be unable to do the kind of content regulation that the public, including 
governments, civil society groups, parents, and other Internet users, clearly expects, such as 
removing nudity, personal attacks, racist language, depictions of violence, terrorist propaganda, 
and many other forms of objectionable content. While First Amendment restrictions are essential 
to limiting the government’s power to interfere with speech, subjecting private service providers 
to the same limitations would undermine widely supported policies promoting safe and family-
friendly content restrictions on the Internet.  
PragerU seems to recognize the radical implications of its constitutional theory, which is 
why Plaintiff is quick to tell the Court that the relief it is seeking is “modest” and “narrow.” 
According to PragerU, YouTube may continue to restrict access to content where it has “clear 
and objective evidence that the content contains obscenity, graphic nudity, or violence, hate 
speech, or is objectively offensive regardless of the political viewpoint or identity of the 
speaker.” PI Mot. at 30. (PragerU offers a slightly different version of this formula elsewhere in 
its brief, which includes a carve-out for videos that contain “profanity.” Id. at 1.) Far from 
solving the problem, however, PragerU’s regulatory standard actually makes it worse.  
The most obvious difficulty with Plaintiff’s formulation is that it has been invented from 
whole cloth. This made-for-litigation standard simply is not the standard that would actually 
apply under the First Amendment. PragerU’s assertion that YouTube would be able to keep 
restricting videos containing nudity, violence, hate speech, and profanity defies black-letter law, 
under which all of those categories are protected speech. See, e.g., Erznoznik v. City of 
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 210-12 (1975) (striking down ban on drive-in theaters showing films 
with nudity); United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 482 (2010) (striking down ban on violent 
videos); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992) (striking down law banning hate crimes); 
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Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 18 (1971) (profanity protected by the First Amendment).5
Likewise, Plaintiff’s suggestion that “objectively offensive” videos could be restricted ignores “a 
bedrock First Amendment principle” that “[s]peech may not be banned on the ground that it 
expresses ideas that offend.” Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1751 (2017). In short, there is no 
basis for Plaintiff’s assurances that applying the First Amendment to YouTube would be modest 
or limited. The fact that PragerU needs to ignore established law to offer such assurances only 
underscores that it does not take seriously its own argument that YouTube is—or should be—
treated like a state actor.  
But even if Plaintiff’s made-up standard were imposed, it would be unworkable. PragerU 
says that YouTube should be allowed to restrict content so long as it is “objectively offensive.” 
But PragerU does not even try to explain what this means or how YouTube possibly could be 
expected to know what qualifies. Presumably, a court would have to construe this standard in 
every instance where a party challenged the removal or restriction of content. This approach 
would be a practical and jurisprudential disaster. The volume of removal requests YouTube 
receives (and the amount of content it has to deal with) is massive. Wu Decl. ¶¶ 9, 12. If every 
decision to remove or restrict content could be judicially challenged by reference to some 
supposedly objective criteria, litigation would be endless and the results of such cases would 
likely be unpredictable and inconsistent. And there would be significant consequences to each 
ruling: if a court found that certain content was not “objectively” offensive (as measured by 
some non-existent standard), YouTube would be powerless to remove it. In short, Plaintiff’s 
requested relief would seriously deter meaningful content regulation in ways that would 
undermine the quality of YouTube’s service and undermine the clear expectations of Congress 
and YouTube users that YouTube will remove or restrict access to material that it considers to be 
5 These First Amendment rules apply not just to prohibitions on such speech, but also to 
regulations restricting its availability to minors. See, e.g., Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 564 
U.S. 786, 805 (2011) (striking down law limiting minor’s access to violent video games); United 
States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 826-27 (2000) (striking down law limiting minor’s 
access to sexually oriented television programming). 
Case 5:17-cv-06064-LHK   Document 37   Filed 02/09/18   Page 27 of 37
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
DEFENDANTS’ OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S MOTION 
FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
-21- CASE NO. 5:17-cv-06064-LHK 
impermissible or mature. E.g., 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(3)-(4); Wu Decl. ¶¶ 4-7, 11, 23. For these 
reasons as well, PragerU has no chance of prevailing on its unprecedented constitutional claims. 
C. Plaintiff’s Claims Are Barred By Section 230(c)(2)(B) of the CDA 
As YouTube has explained in its motion to dismiss, all of Plaintiff’s claims—other than 
its meritless First Amendment claim—are also barred by Section 230 of the CDA. MTD at 10-
12. This federal immunity independently rules out any injunction based on those claims. See, 
e.g., Kathleen R. v. City of Livermore, 87 Cal. App. 4th 684, 698 (2001) (Section 230 bars claims 
for injunctive and declaratory relief); Asia Econ. Inst. v. Xcentric Ventures LLC, 2011 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 145380, at *21 (C.D. Cal. May 4, 2011) (same). 
In enacting Section 230, Congress sought “to remove disincentives for the development 
and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents to restrict their 
children’s access to objectionable or inappropriate online material.” 47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(4). To 
that end, the statute seeks to encourage providers of online services to develop tools for 
restricting access to material that they or their users might deem inappropriate, an approach that 
both avoided the constitutional problems of direct government speech regulation and that was 
more flexible. 141 Cong. Rec. H8471 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Wyden) 
(“Under our approach … the marketplace is going to give parents the tools they need”).
Restricted Mode is precisely the kind of tool that Congress wanted to encourage and protect from 
civil claims like those made by PragerU.  
Aware that Section 230 poses a barrier to its case, Plaintiff tries to preemptively explain 
why the statute does not apply. PI Mot. at 11-13. This effort fails. First, PragerU ignores the most 
relevant provision of Section 230. Plaintiff focuses on Section 230(c)(2)(A), spending much time 
arguing why that provision’s “good faith” requirement is not satisfied. Id. at 11-12. But YouTube 
has not relied on Section 230(c)(2)(A). Instead, the subsection at issue is 230(c)(2)(B). That 
provision is specifically tailored to the situation here: where an online service provider provides 
a tool that helps its users restrict access to content that the users or the provider considers “lewd 
… excessively violent … harassing, or otherwise objectionable.”  MTD at 11. And, critically, 
Section 230(c)(2)(B) contains no good-faith requirement. See Enigma Software Grp. USA LLC v. 
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Malwarebytes Inc., 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 184658, at *7-8 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2017). Plaintiff’s 
arguments about good faith are simply besides the point. 
Second, PragerU’s argument that its videos do not meet the criteria for “obscene, lewd, 
lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, harassing, or otherwise objectionable” material ignores the 
plain text of the statute. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(A). Plaintiff contends that YouTube can only 
restrict access to videos that are “objectively ‘otherwise objectionable’” (PI Mot. at 13), but the 
statute, by its terms, imposes a subjective standard: whether the service provider or the user 
“considers” the material to be “objectionable.” Congress deliberately adopted a subjective test, 
not only because what is plausibly deemed objectionable may vary from one service to the next, 
but also to give broad flexibility to providers and their users to restrict material. See, e.g., 141 
Cong. Rec. H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox on amendment that 
introduced the language in 230(c)) (“We can keep away from our children things not only 
prohibited by law, but prohibited by parents.”). And this is exactly how the provision has been 
applied. See Holomaxx Techs. Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 94316, at *6 
(N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2011) (explaining that Section 230(c)(2) “allows an interactive service 
provider to establish standards of decency”); Zango, Inc. v. Kaspersky Lab, Inc., 2007 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 97332, at *11 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 28, 2007) (“[The CDA] does not require that the 
material actually be objectionable; rather, it affords protection for blocking material ‘that the 
provider or user considers to be’ objectionable.”), aff’d, 568 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2009); 
e360Insight, LLC v. Comcast Corp., 546 F. Supp. 2d 605, 608 (N.D. Ill. 2008) (Section 230 
“imposes a subjective element” into whether provider deemed material objectionable). PragerU’s 
effort to rewrite the statute should be rejected. 
Third, Plaintiff’s invocation of ejusdem generis to limit the scope of the “otherwise 
objectionable” language is equally unavailing. The crabbed reading that PragerU proposes 
disregards Congress’s intent to give service providers and their users flexibility in determining 
what material is objectionable. Plaintiff’s approach also drains the term of any independent 
force. PragerU would restrict “otherwise objectionable” to material that is “similar to material 
that is found to be obscene, lewd, lascivious, filthy, excessively violent, or harassing” (PI Mot. at 
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11), but such material is already covered by those more specific terms. Congress expected the 
immunity to sweep more broadly, to cover decisions to restrict material that providers or users 
might consider objectionable in some way other than those specifically listed in the statue. See, 
e.g., Langdon, 474 F. Supp. 2d at 631; e360Insight, 546 F. Supp. 2d at 608. For example, a video 
praising factory farming might not fit within the specific adjectives of 230(c)(2), but on a website 
devoted to promoting veganism, it surely would be “otherwise objectionable.” Moreover, 
ejusdem generis does not apply where, as here, there is no common attribute linking the specific 
items in the list. See Ali v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 552 U.S. 214, 225-26 (2008). There is no way 
to give a limiting construction to the phrase “otherwise objectionable” so that it harmonizes with 
each of the various descriptors that precede it. Given that, the term should be “construed to mean 
exactly what it says.” Harrison v. PPG Indus., Inc., 446 U.S. 578, 589 (1980) (rejecting ejusdem 
generis where the literal meaning of the catch-all term was clear).6
In short, the phrase “otherwise objectionable” perfectly captures the videos at issue here, 
which YouTube determined were among the kind of mature content that would be objectionable 
to the users who activated Restricted Mode. Wu Decl. ¶¶ 39-41. Indeed, that would be true even 
on Plaintiff’s narrow reading. Many of the PragerU videos that have been excluded from 
Restricted Mode fall within the specified categories listed in Section 230(c)(2): they could be 
considered “lewd,”  “lascivious,” (e.g., id. ¶ 42 (video entitled “Are 1 in 5 Women Raped at 
College”)), “excessively violent” (e.g., id. (video entitled “Why isn’t Communism as hated as 
Nazism?”)), or objectionable—especially in light of Restricted Mode’s (and Section 230’s) 
purpose of protecting especially sensitive users from sexual, violent, and similarly disturbing 
content. Section 230(c)(2)(B) squarely applies to Plaintiff’s claims and rules out any injunction.  
6 While the court in Song fi Inc. v. Google, Inc., 108 F. Supp. 3d 876, 883-84 (N.D. Cal. 
2015) applied the principle of ejusdem generis to Section 230(c)(2)(A), YouTube believes that 
case was wrongly decided and, in any event, the court there held only that “otherwise 
objectionable” did not cover an “allegedly artificially inflated view count” for a video. Id. at 883. 
This case is different, and even the Song fi court specifically acknowledged that a narrowed 
construction of the statute still would cover videos containing “offensive materials.” Id.  
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D. Plaintiff’s Claims Are Barred By Section 230(c)(1) of the CDA 
Plaintiff’s claims (other than its First Amendment claim) are also barred by the separate 
but reinforcing protection of Section 230(c)(1). See MTD at 9-10. PragerU acknowledges 
Section 230(c)(1), but asserts with little analysis that the provision does not apply to this case. PI 
Mot. at 10. Established law says otherwise. Multiple decisions in this District (and from this 
Court) have expressly held that 230(c)(1) immunizes service providers against claims arising 
from their editorial functions—including blocking or withdrawing user-submitted content from 
publication on their services. See Sikhs for Justice “SFJ”, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 144 F. Supp. 3d 
1088, 1095 (N.D. 2015) (Koh, J.) (Facebook’s blocking of plaintiff’s page is “publisher conduct 
immunized by [Section 230(c)(1) of] the CDA”), aff’d, 697 F. App’x 526 (9th Cir. 2017); 
Lancaster v. Alphabet Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 88908, at *7-8 (N.D. Cal. July 8, 2016); 
Darnaa, LLC v. Google, Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 152126, at *23 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 2, 2016).7
Rather than engage with this on-point authority, Plaintiff asserts that subsection (c)(1) 
could not apply where (c)(2) also applies, because doing so would render “230(c)(2) meaningless 
surplusage.” PI Mot. at 10. The Ninth Circuit has rejected this very argument. In Barnes, the 
Court of Appeals—after confirming that Section 230(c)(1), “by itself” shields from liability “all 
publication decisions,” including the decision to “remove” content—went on to explain that 
“Subsection (c)(2), for its part, provides an additional shield from liability.” 570 F.3d at 1105 
(emphases added). “Crucially,” the Court observed:  
the persons who can take advantage of this [(c)(2) immunity] are not merely those whom 
subsection (c)(1) already protects, but any provider of an interactive computer service. 
Thus, even those who cannot take advantage of subsection (c)(1), perhaps because they 
developed, even in part, the content at issue, can take advantage of subsection (c)(2) if 
they act to restrict access to the content because they consider it obscene or otherwise 
objectionable. Additionally, subsection (c)(2) also protects internet service providers 
7 These decisions are based on clear Ninth Circuit precedent applying Section 230(c)(1). In 
Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., the Court of Appeals explained that removal decisions are among the 
publisher functions immunized by Section 230(c)(1) as “publication involves reviewing, editing, 
and deciding whether to publish or to withdraw from publication third-party content.” 570 F.3d 
1096, 1102 (9th Cir. 2009) (emphasis added); see also id. at 1105. And the Ninth Circuit recently 
affirmed this court’s decision in Sikhs for Justice, confirming that Section 230(c)(1) applies in 
these circumstances. Sikhs for Justice, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 697 F. App’x 526 (9th Cir. 2017).
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from liability not for publishing or speaking, but rather for actions taken to restrict access 
to obscene or otherwise objectionable content. 
Id. Applying (c)(1) to bar claims based on the removal of user-submitted content—as this Court 
has rightly done—does not render (c)(2) superfluous. And while there will be some cases, like 
this one, where both provisions apply, such overlapping protection is not surprising. Instead, it 
reflects Congress’s powerful intent to encourage self-policing by online service providers and its 
insistence that providers who exercise discretion to manage content on their platform should be 
shielded from liability in the strongest terms.8
E. Plaintiff Has No Likelihood of Prevailing On Its Non-Constitutional Claims  
Even putting aside YouTube’s immunities under the First Amendment and Section 230, 
PragerU has no likelihood of success on its non-constitutional claims. Plaintiff’s motion does 
little more than recite the elements of these claims and summarily assert that it meets them. This 
is not enough to state a claim (MTD at 18-22), much less show that PragerU will likely prevail.  
Unruh Act. Among other deficiencies discussed in YouTube’s motion to dismiss (id. at 
18-19), PragerU ignores the requirement that in a case like this, which is not linked to a claim 
under the federal Americans with Disabilities Act, it must “plead and prove intentional 
discrimination.” Greater L.A. Agency of Deafness, Inc. v. CNN Inc., 742 F.3d 414, 425 (9th Cir. 
2014) (emphasis added). Plaintiff offers no evidence of such intentional discrimination. Indeed, 
the only evidence that PragerU offers are allegations that its videos have been treated differently 
than other, similar videos. Strazzeri Decl. ¶¶ 6, 11 & Ex. C. This is insufficient. See Greater L.A. 
8 Plaintiff’s argument that Section 230 does not apply to discrimination claims is not 
supported even by the cases it cites. PI Mot. at 13. The Ninth Circuit in Roommates.com declined 
to apply Section 230 not because the plaintiff alleged discriminatory conduct, but because the 
service provider was “‘responsible’ at least ‘in part’” for creating the allegedly discriminatory 
content at issue. Fair Hous. Council v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157, 1167 (9th Cir. 
2008). That is not the situation here. Likewise, neither Airbnb, Inc. v. City & Cty. of S.F., 217 F. 
Supp. 3d 1066, 1076 (N.D. Cal. 2016), nor Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc., 824 F.3d 846, 851 (9th 
Cir. 2016), remotely suggest that discrimination claims fall outside Section 230’s protections. 
Indeed, neither case even involved such a claim. In contrast, this Court’s decision in Sikhs for 
Justice confirms that Section 230 applies even where Plaintiff alleges discrimination in violation 
of federal and state law. See Sikhs for Justice, 144 F. Supp. 3d at 1090. 
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Agency of Deafness, 742 F.3d at 425 (“[P]laintiff must therefore allege, and show, more than the 
disparate impact of a facially neutral policy.”). The evidence confirms that YouTube did not 
discriminate against PragerU when it classified a limited subset of its videos as “Teen” or higher 
based on the content of those videos. See Wu Decl. ¶¶ 39-42, 50-52.  
UCL. As an initial matter, PragerU cannot overcome the UCL’s “safe harbor,” which 
protects from liability conduct that is expressly encouraged by law (here, Section 230). Cel-Tech 
Commc’ns, Inc. v. L.A. Cellular Tel. Co., 20 Cal. 4th 163, 182, 185  (1999); see MTD 19-20. But 
even on the merits, Plaintiff’s UCL claim fails. Plaintiff fails to show, as it must, that it lost 
“money or property” as a result of the actions it now seeks to enjoin. Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 
17204. Indeed, Plaintiff does not even argue that the unavailability of fewer than 12% of its 
videos to the tiny fraction of YouTube users using Restricted Mode has caused any tangible 
economic injury to PragerU. 
As to the other elements of the UCL, none of Plaintiff’s other claims have any merit, so 
Plaintiff cannot proceed under the statute’s “unlawful” prong. Any claim of “fraudulent” conduct 
fails because PragerU offers no evidence that any of YouTube’s public statements about 
Restricted Mode are false or misleading, much less that PragerU actually relied to its detriment 
on those statements. See Rosado v. eBay Inc., 53 F. Supp. 3d 1256, 1264-65 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
Nor is there any basis for a claim under the statute’s “unfair” prong. PragerU fails to show any 
“actual or threatened impact on competition,” as it must in a case like this. See Cel-Tech, 20 Cal. 
4th at 186-87; MTD at 20. Plaintiff’s only argument that YouTube’s actions were unfair is its 
conclusory assertion that those actions are motivated by “political and religious animus.” PI Mot. 
at 27. As discussed above, however, Plaintiff cannot carry its burden of showing a likelihood of 
succeeding on that baseless allegation.  
Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith. Plaintiff cannot avoid the key problem 
with its claim—YouTube’s agreements with its users specifically permit the actions it took here, 
so there can be no breach of the implied covenant. See Storek & Storek, Inc. v. Citicorp Real 
Estate, Inc., 100 Cal. App. 4th 44, 56-57 (2002); Wu Decl. Exs. 1-6; MTD at 21-22. Plaintiff 
simply ignores language in YouTube’s Terms of Service that expressly “reserve[] the right to 
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remove Content,” (Wu Decl. Ex. 1), and language in the incorporated Community Guidelines 
explaining that YouTube may restrict access to videos about mature topics (Wu Decl. Ex. 2). See
MTD 21-22. A court in this district has found that these provisions give YouTube the right to 
remove videos from the service altogether or from a given location, and thus defeat an implied 
covenant claim. Song fi, 108 F. Supp. 3d at 885. That authority also includes the more limited 
step of restricting videos from being displayed in Restricted Mode.9
Plaintiff asserts that the contractual provisions that expressly permit YouTube to do what 
it did here are “vague and subjective” (PI Mot. at 26), but beyond this bald assertion Plaintiff 
does not show that these provisions fail to give YouTube the authority to restrict its videos. 
Indeed, Plaintiff acknowledges that YouTube sets forth “criteria” for the restriction of videos, 
but it fails to explain how YouTube taking action pursuant to those criteria could support a 
claim. Nor is PragerU’s argument about Google’s motive and supposed “pretexts” (id.) relevant. 
See Damabeh v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 66565, at *15-16 & n.4 (N.D. Cal. May 
8, 2013) (Koh, J.) (dismissing implied covenant claim based on allegedly malicious termination 
of franchise agreement). In any event, the evidence reveals that YouTube did not act with the bad 
faith or animus that Plaintiff asserts. Wu Decl. ¶¶ 39-42, 50. 
II. PLAINTIFF CANNOT SATISFY THE REMAINING WINTER FACTORS 
Beyond failing to show that it has a likelihood (or even a serious chance) of prevailing on 
the merits of its claims, PragerU also fails to carry its burden on the remaining Winter elements. 
A. Plaintiff Cannot Show Irreparable Harm 
Plaintiff’s sole argument that it has been irreparably harmed is its contention that its 
speech is being silenced. PI Mot. at 28. But this claim of silenced speech is disconnected from 
the actual facts of the case. PragerU had not been silenced or “censored”: all of its videos are 
available on YouTube; none of them have been removed from the service or even age-restricted. 
Wu Decl. ¶ 39. Any YouTube user who wants to see those videos can do so, and the 98 percent 
9 Plaintiff’s reliance on Darnaa, LLC v. Google, Inc. is misplaced—that case involved 
allegations that YouTube took action against videos based on view count manipulation. 2015 
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 161791, at *16-18 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 2, 2015). 
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of YouTube users who choose not to use Restricted Mode on an average day would never even 
know that those videos were not available in Restricted Mode. Id. ¶ 22. PragerU has not been 
irreparably harmed merely because a small percentage of its videos are not available to users 
who specifically chose to limit their YouTube experience by activating Restricted Mode.  
Plaintiff’s rhetoric about silenced speech is even more implausible given the nature of the 
Internet: nothing that YouTube has done has any effect on Plaintiff’s ability to put its videos up 
elsewhere online. Cf. Zhang, 10 F. Supp. 3d at 441 (“if a user is dissatisfied with Baidu’s search 
results, he or she ‘has access, with just a click of the mouse, to Google, Microsoft’s Bing, 
Yahoo! Search, and other general-purpose search engines’”).10 Thus, while it may be true that a 
violation of a party’s First Amendment rights is often enough to show irreparable harm, this case 
is different. Here, given the very limited action that YouTube has taken, the ready availability of 
Plaintiff’s videos both on YouTube and elsewhere, and the simple fact that YouTube is not the 
government, merely invoking the First Amendment is not enough for Prager to establish an 
injury that cannot be remedied without a preliminary injunction.  
B. An Injunction Would Impose Substantial Hardships on YouTube and Its 
Users and Would Be Contrary to the Public Interest 
PragerU also ignores the harms that an injunction would inflict upon YouTube, its users, 
and the public interest. Plaintiff seeks to override the choices made by YouTube and the users 
who have enabled Restricted Mode. Those users have made a deliberate decision that they want 
to see only a limited selection of YouTube videos, ones that do not include material that 
YouTube has determined is potentially mature. The injunction that PragerU seeks would harm 
those users’ interests by exposing them to exactly the kind of material they have indicated they 
wish to avoid. See Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 716 (2000) (“The unwilling listener’s interest 
in avoiding unwanted communication has been repeatedly identified in our cases.”). 
10 Indeed, Plaintiff currently hosts these videos directly on its own website, 
https://www.prageru.com/, in a category entitled “Restricted by YouTube.” 
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At the same time, as discussed in Section I.A, supra, Plaintiff’s proposed injunction 
would significantly impair YouTube’s own First Amendment rights, by compelling YouTube to 
display content to particular users in a particular way. A mandatory injunction overriding 
YouTube’s judgment and requiring the publication of content in ways that a private service 
provider determined to be inappropriate would inflict serious—and indeed irreparable—harm on 
YouTube. See, e.g., Aldrich, 440 F.2d at 133 (affirming denial of injunction that sought to force 
newspaper to print advertisements). These interests tilt the balance of hardships decisively 
against the injunction that Plaintiff seeks. 
Finally, Plaintiff ignores the broader public interest at stake in this case. PragerU seeks 
something essentially unprecedented—an injunction forcing an online service provider to display 
a user’s content in the precise way the user demands, and to include that content in a feature 
designed to protect sensitive users from potentially mature content. That would harm the public’s 
interest. That is especially so given the broader consequences of Plaintiff’s legal theory. As 
discussed above (supra at 18-21), an injunction curtailing YouTube’s ability to manage content 
on its service would undermine YouTube’s efforts—and those of similar online platforms—to 
shield the public from a whole range of objectionable material posted to their services. PragerU’s 
effort to treat such providers as the equivalent of the government would substantially limit their 
ability to take action against pornography or sexually explicit content, material that glorifies 
terrorism or violent acts, hate speech and other potentially abusive user behavior, and much else.  
The self-serving (and legally baseless) limitations that Plaintiff tries to build into its 
proposed injunction would not solve those problems. Subjecting every content restriction by an 
online service provider to an undefined “objectively offensive” standard (PI Mot. at 30), invites 
only uncertainty and confusion. Unsure of what user-submitted content they could actually 
restrict, providers would be significantly chilled in their effort to self-regulate and act for the 
benefit of the families, minors, and other sensitive individuals who use their services.   
Congress has recognized this powerful public interest in enacting Section 230. In doing 
so, Congress declared it the “policy of the United States” to “to remove disincentives for the 
development and utilization of blocking and filtering technologies that empower parents to 
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restrict their children’s access to objectionable or inappropriate online material.” 47 U.S.C.  
§ 230(b)(4). Indeed, to inject the government into service providers’ decisions about how to 
shield their users from potentially problematic content is precisely the outcome that Congress 
sought to avoid. See 141 Cong. Rec. H8470 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cox) 
(“[W]e do not wish to have content regulation by the Federal Government of what is on the 
Internet.”). Plaintiff’s proposed injunction is contrary to this important public interest. 
CONCLUSION
For these reasons, PragerU’s motion for a preliminary injunction should be denied. 
February 9, 2018 Respectfully submitted, 
WILSON SONSINI GOODRICH & ROSATI 
Professional Corporation 
By: /s/ Brian M. Millen
Brian M. Willen 
Attorneys for Defendants Google LLC and 
YouTube, LLC. 
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